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In a two-stage model insurance companies ﬁrst decide upon risk
classiﬁcation and then compete in prices. I show that the observed
heterogeneous behavior of similar ﬁrms is compatible with rational be-
havior. On the deregulated German insurance market individual ap-
plication of classiﬁcation schemes induces welfare losses due to cream
skimming. Classiﬁcation costs and pricing above marginal cost can
be prevented by common industry-wide loss statistics which already
exist to a rudimentary extent. They allow competition to approach
Bertrand type. The computation of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for
Bertrand competition allows to explain the decrease of industry proﬁt
after deregulation.
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The realization of the Single European insurance Market approaches comple-
tion by the implementation of the third Life Directive1 and the third non-Life
Directive2 into national legislation. In Germany, this took place in 1994 with
basically two important changes. The ﬁrst is the home state regulation. In-
surance companies need only a single authorization of one member-state to
operate in Europe. The second is the extensive deregulation which gives
the autonomy of policy conditions and premium calculation to the insurance
company. Before 1994 any change had to be ﬁled and approved by the reg-
ulatory agency before it could be applied. In fact, most policy conditions
were elaborated by the German Insurance Association3 and they came into
force for all insurance companies simultaneously and uniformly. Now, after
1994, insurance companies are free to calculate premiums and to apply them
immediately. For this calculation the ﬁrms are allowed to ask the applicants
for many more information than before and actually some ﬁrms classify risks
according to a high number of criteria while others apply the same criteria
like before the 1994 deregulation. Although all ﬁrms start simultaneously
product and price competition, they do not behave identically. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to explore the incentives of the ﬁrms either to classify
risks or not and to explain how the observed heterogeneous market outcome
results from individually rational behavior.
Mostly, business consists of selling goods or services to customers. Al-
though a good may be homogeneous in the perception of both, consumers
and producers, its properties may vary according to some speciﬁcs of the
customer who purchases a particular good. Customers may diﬀer in the cost
of serving them. The present paper concentrates on the insurance market. In
this context, insurance coverage is purely homogeneous when it is a manda-
tory insurance with standard policy conditions. A customer carries out his
duty when he can make proof of an insurance policy. When all insurance
companies oﬀer the policy conditions as required by law, the customers are
indiﬀerent between all suppliers unless they diﬀer in premiums. The qual-
ity is homogeneous in the perception of the consumers. For the insurance
companies, every single policy is a contingent payment. Although customers
may incur similar kinds of losses, e.g. accidents, they will diﬀer in accident
1Council Directive (EEC) 92/96 of 18 June 1992 OJ L360/1.
2Council Directive (EEC) 92/49 of 10 November 1992 OJ L228/1.
3Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft e.V.
1proneness. The latter property is speciﬁc to the purchaser and does not de-
pend on the insurance company’s promise to pay an indemnity in case of a
loss.
Cream skimming consists of assessing the cost of serving a customer and
it aims at attracting those customers from a competitor which can be served
at lower cost. On an insurance market, one ﬁrm may assess an applicant
with a detailed questionnaire to estimate the expected loss of the applicant.
If it realizes that an actual good risk is accorded an average premium by a
competitor, it can oﬀer a lower premium which still covers the expected loss
and it will be able to pick raisins from the competitor’s customer base due
to a more sophisticated screening method. An inactive ﬁrm which oﬀers a
uniform premium to a wide range of customers is vulnerable when it faces
a competitor which is applying a highly sophisticated classiﬁcation scheme.
On average, worse risks remain to the inactive ﬁrm and this decreases proﬁt
or even leads to losses. Cream skimming is costly. Firms have to spend
resources in collecting information from applicants. It is not evident that all
ﬁrms implement screening mechanisms to the same extent.
Cream Skimming is not speciﬁc to the insurance market. The situation of
homogeneous goods served to customers which cause diﬀerent costs can also
be found on other markets than insurance although to a lesser extent. In the
banking sector, there are customer who are reliant to individual assistance
when withdrawing money or for transfers. Others do their business via the
internet and no labor force is needed to proceed their payments or transfers.
If a bank charges a uniform price for both groups of customers, a competitor
may oﬀer banking services without manpower and, consequently, serve only
those customers which generate less costs to the bank. These customers can
be charged a lower fee and the customers who do not rely on individual
assistance will switch to the cheaper bank. The remaining customers will
choose the bank which is charging a uniform fee for all customers.
In retail sales, there are customers who pay cash and others who proceed
their payments with credit cards. The latter cause higher costs to the shop
although both groups buy the same product. Yet, it is unusual to charge an
additional fee to customers who pay with credit cards.
For cream skimming it is necessary that consumers diﬀer in some prop-
erties which are private information to them but which can be disclosed to
ﬁrms in a credible way. Here, I will concentrate on expected loss which is
an important property of an applicant for insurance coverage when ﬁrms
2have to quote a rate. A further condition for cream skimming is that ﬁrms
must proﬁt from cream skimming net of screening costs. When ﬁrms classify
risks by applying identical classifying schemes, information is symmetric and
competition is reduced to price competition for each distinct risk class. Im-
proving the screening mechanism allows for further distinctions within risk
classes and, hence, allows, for cream skimming. While one ﬁrm proﬁts from
cream skimming it simultaneously harms its competitor. On a market for
mandatory insurance the provision of coverage is guaranteed because demand
is inelastic. Only resources spent for screening activities are foregone and,
thus, relevant for welfare considerations. Introducing elastic demand would
allow for further welfare losses when prices diﬀer from marginal cost. Ad-
ditional eﬀects would emerge if the application of risk classiﬁcation schemes
aﬀected probabilities or magnitude of losses but moral hazard is out of the
scope of the present analysis.
In this paper I will infer that the observed risk classiﬁcation activities on
the deregulated market are compatible with the rational behavior assump-
tion. Furthermore, the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium can explain that
similar ﬁrms behave diﬀerently in the same market. This can better be ex-
plained by mutual uncertainty about payoﬀ functions than the classical view
that ﬁrms randomize their actions. Firms applied risk classiﬁcation schemes
immediately after they were allowed to do so because ﬁrms prefer being the
sole classifying ﬁrm and, once a ﬁrm classiﬁes, no further ﬁrm will engage
in classifying. Welfare considerations suggest to allow ﬁrms to run common
loss statistics open to all ﬁrms. This reduces over all classiﬁcation cost and
competition will align premiums to marginal cost. The recent development
of European directives facilitating uniform but rudimentary risk classiﬁca-
tion as public information is consistent with this implication. Finally, the
results of this model are in line with the established results of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) who inter alia identify a negative externality of bad risks
on good risks due to the mere presence of the former while ﬁrms make zero
expected proﬁt.
The next section will present the model. Two ﬁrms can develop costly
risk classiﬁcation schemes. Each ﬁrm knows the distribution of its competi-
tor’s cost and the precise amount of its own cost. After the ﬁrms know how
much it would cost to them, they decide whether to classify applicants for
insurance coverage or not in the next stage. After the outcome of the classi-
ﬁcation decision becomes common knowledge, price competition determines
the payoﬀs. The last stage will be presented before the classiﬁcation decision
3because the game will be solved by backwards induction. After a discussion
of the model, the concluding section summarizes the main results and gives
statements on insurance competition policy.
2 The Model
Let there be a continuum of consumers which are uniformly distributed on
the interval [0;1]. Each consumer buys exactly one good from one of the two
ﬁrms i = 1,2. The goods are homogeneous and every consumer seeks for the
oﬀer with the lowest price. If both ﬁrms oﬀer identical prices, I assume that
the ﬁrms equally share the market. Before selling insurance policies, the ﬁrms
i = 1,2 decide whether to apply a risk classiﬁcation scheme or not. From
classifying, the ﬁrms learn to distinguish the a good from the 1−a bad risks.
For simplicity, assume that good risks have zero expected loss. Customers
from the high-risk class have expected loss c > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the
structure of the consumers. The broken horizontal line indicates the expected
loss of a random customer. For every single customer a loss is a random event.
However, from the perspective of an insurance company, it is appropriate to
focus on the expected loss. The law of large numbers ensures that the actual
average claim approaches the expected loss arbitrarily close when the number





Figure 1: Risk Classes
Firms have to develop a classiﬁcation scheme before applying it. I will call
this the ﬁrst stage of the model. The development will cost a precise amount
Ki to ﬁrm i which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0;T].
I will assume that ﬁrms can only develop identical schemes but it will cost
them a random amount. Each ﬁrm will be informed about the distribution of
its competitor’s cost but not the exact value of the realization and it knows
its own development cost. All this is common knowledge to both ﬁrms.
4After nature assigns Ki to ﬁrm i, the ﬁrms decide about developing and
applying a classiﬁcation scheme in the second stage. Then the outcome of
the classiﬁcation decision becomes common knowledge. In the third stage,
premiums are set and payoﬀs are realized.
Before deciding about classifying activities in the ﬁrst stage, the con-
sequences in the second stage have to be considered. Hence, according to
backwards induction I present the pricing of insurance policies for each out-
come of the ﬁrst stage before exploring the classifying decision. Basically,
two scenarios may occur: both ﬁrms take the same decision in the ﬁrst stage
(section 2.1) or only one of the two ﬁrms classiﬁes (section 2.2). If both ﬁrms
take the same decision, in the ﬁrst stage, there is conceptually no diﬀerence
whether both or no ﬁrm classiﬁes. Both situations will be presented in the
next subsection before I derive the equilibrium in the asymmetric situation
where only one ﬁrm classiﬁes.
2.1 Symmetric Classiﬁcation Decision
If both ﬁrms classify, there are two distinct markets. From each of them,
the ﬁrms know exactly the expected cost of serving a customer and they
can set a price for each of them independently. If no ﬁrm classiﬁes, none of
them can distinguish good and bad risks and the only information available
is the average expected loss of an arbitrary customer. In this situation, the
ﬁrms face an analogous setting to the above and this allows to analyze both
symmetric classifying decisions simultaneously.
Insurance coverage with standard uniform policies is a homogeneous good.
The customers choose their insurance company only according to the pre-
mium level. This behavior is the same for all consumers and, hence, the ﬁrm
which oﬀers the lowest premium will collect all customers of the relevant
market. This setting corresponds to Bertrand price competition.
Originally, Bertrand (1883, p. 503) criticized Cournot’s conjecture of
quantity setting ﬁrms. Cournot had argued that a cartel would not be sta-
ble because ﬁrms would undercut each other in prices to attract the com-
plete market. With the same argument Bertrand expressed his doubt on
the quantity setting ﬁrms which could still undercut their prices. For this
crucial argument to be valid, it is necessary that all ﬁrms have suﬃciently
large capacities to serve the entire market, if they undercut their competitor’s
price. One century later, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) work out the market
5scenarios which correspond to the two duopoly outcomes. While Cournot
envisages the typical manufacturing ﬁrm where goods are produced and sold
at a later stage, ﬁrms in the Bertrand setting simultaneously decide on pro-
duction and prices. The ﬁrst setting yields Cournot outcomes and the latter
yields marginal cost pricing. In the present context, ﬁrms are not restraint
by capacities. Price and quantity decisions can be revised at any time. On
the insurance market the assumption that every ﬁrm could serve the entire
market ﬁts the actual situation.
The well-established outcome of Bertrand competition is marginal cost
pricing. Actually, this is a Nash equilibrium because none of the ﬁrms has an
incentive to change its price. Raising the price would deter all customers and
lowering it would result in losses. However, besides this unique equilibrium
in pure strategies, mixed-strategy equilibria exist too. Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986, p. 29) state in a theorem that the solution is symmetric and prices are
set according to an atomless density function where the support is an open
interval. The existence of an equilibrium in Dasgupta and Maskin holds for
cases where the ﬁrms have limited capacities, may be smaller than demand
would be at marginal cost pricing. Their theorem also covers the case where
any ﬁrm could serve the entire demand on its own.
The solution to a mixed-strategy equilibrium is a density function. The
expected payoﬀ has to be equal for every price which is played with a pos-
itive probability.4 The intuition of the equilibrium is that a higher price
promises higher proﬁt with a lower probability and vice versa. For the ﬁrm
to be indiﬀerent between two distinct prices, the payoﬀs resulting from the
prices conditional upon undercutting the competitor are weighted with the
probability of being the ﬁrm with the lower price as to obtain constant ex-
pected payoﬀ. For the computational method to obtain the mixed-strategy
equilibrium Dasgupta and Maskin refer to Beckmann (1967). His analysis is
restricted to situations where the ﬁrms may have less capacity than necessary
to serve the entire market. In this case, it should be obvious that a ﬁrm never
sets a price equal to marginal cost because it could raise the price without
losing customers when the competitor has exhausted its capacity. However,
the shape of the density function which corresponds to the equilibrium in
Beckmann (1967) ﬁts the above intuition.
The present setting diﬀers slightly from Beckmann’s. The ﬁrms face
an inelastic demand. Third party liability insurance is mandatory to every
4See Owen 1995, p. 75.
6vehicle owner. Every insurer could easily serve the entire market. So, the
capacity of a single ﬁrm is always larger than the maximum demand.
Assume that both ﬁrms i = 1,2 compete for customers with expected
cost γ. Let γ be zero or c if both ﬁrms can distinguish both risk classes,
or γ can be (1 − a)c if both ﬁrms do not classify. Let Fi(x) = Pr(pi ≤ x)
be the putative equilibrium probability distributions of the Bertrand game.
Furthermore assume that the open interval S = (u;v) is the common support
of the equilibrium density function indicated by Dasgupta and Maskin. Let
u > γ and v ∈ (u;∞). Proﬁt for ﬁrm 1 is (p1 − γ)[1 − F2(p1)] and the ﬁrst
order condition is
1 − F2(p1) − (p1 − γ)F
0
2(p1) = 0. (1)
One solution of this diﬀerential equation is F2(x) = 1 −
D2
x−γ where D2 is
constant and x ∈ S. For Fi(x) to be a distribution function Fi(x) ≥ 0 for
x ∈ S, Fi(x) = 0 for x ≤ inf S and Fi(x) = 1 for x ≥ supS and F 0
i(x) ≥ 0
for x ∈ S.








are the solutions for x ∈ S with D1 = D2 = u − γ and supS = ∞.
The expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i is constant for all prices pi ∈ S. For i 6=
j Eπi(pi) = (pi − γ)[1 − Fj(pi)] = (pi − γ)
u−γ
pi−γ = u − γ. In addition,
Eπi(p0
i) < Eπi(pi) veriﬁes that no ﬁrm has an incentive to undercut its
competitor’s price for p0
i < u and pi ∈ S because the expected proﬁts would
be p0
i − γ < u − γ which is always true.
This particular setting yields positive expected proﬁt u − γ to the par-
ticipating ﬁrms but the assumption of an inelastic demand over the entire
range of possible prices is restrictive. Although insurance coverage may be
mandatory, the customers may refrain from owning an automobile when in-
surance premiums are prohibitively high. The maximum possible loss can
be considered as an upper bound for insurance premium. If insurance is not
mandatory, not even an extremely risk averse customer is willing to pay more
than the loss in case of an accident.5
Kaplan and Wettstein (2000, pp. 69 f.) show that the supremum of the
support must be inﬁnite for an equilibrium in mixed strategies to exist. So,
5See McKenna (1986), p. 87.
7the equilibrium presented above cannot be realized if all customers have a
ﬁnite choke-price. Harrington (1989) has shown that the Bertrand paradox
(zero proﬁt) outcome is the only equilibrium outcome when ﬁrms produce at
constant marginal cost and market demand is bounded, continuous, down-
ward sloping, and has a ﬁnite choke-price.6 Baye and Morgan relax the
assumption of a ﬁnite choke-price. When ﬁrms are uncertain about the cus-
tomers’ choke-price because they only know their distribution, still a mixed
strategy equilibrium can exist. As an example, they compute the equilibrium
distribution when the maximum willingness to pay is drawn from a Pareto
distribution. The variations of the above computation show that positive ex-
pected proﬁt is compatible with elastic demand and with customers having
bounded choke-prices.
The crucial condition for the mixed-strategy equilibrium (F1,F2) to emerge
is that the supports of the two distributions must be the same.7 If they were
not, the distribution functions are not an equilibrium and only the pure
strategy-equilibrium with marginal cost pricing can emerge. To ensure a
positive expected proﬁt, the ﬁrms have to coordinate on the lower bound of
the support of their equilibrium distribution function. This will also deter-
mine their expected proﬁts. Under regulation before 1994 all premiums had
to be ﬁled to the regulatory agency and could be applied only after approval.
The agency veriﬁed that the insurance companies do not set too low premi-
ums to prevent insolvencies. The calculations are based on industry statistics
which are identical for all ﬁrms. This process of prior approval can credibly
establish a lower bound for the price choice of the ﬁrms. Under regulation
it is legitimate to assume that an actual lower bound exists which cannot be
undercut by any ﬁrm. Now, after 1994, there is no coordinating institution
which is necessary to establish a mixed-strategy equilibrium. As agreements
on price setting practices are illegal on competitive markets, the only Nash
equilibrium is marginal cost pricing with zero proﬁt.
Finally, the payoﬀs for the case of the symmetric classiﬁcation decision
can be speciﬁed. Failure to coordinate a common lower bound of the support
ends up in the Bertrand paradox outcome with prices equal to marginal cost
γ. The revenue from selling insurance policies is equal to expected claims.
In addition to the claims, the ﬁrms have to bear the classiﬁcation costs Ki if
they decide to classify. Hence, proﬁt is zero when no ﬁrm classiﬁes and it is
−Ki when both ﬁrms classify. The detailed presentation of mixed-strategy
6Baye and Morgan (1999), p. 60.
7See Kaplan and Wettstein (2000, p. 67) for a proof of this argument.
8equilibria will help to discuss the motivation of regulation from the ﬁrm’s
point of view in the discussion of the model.
2.2 Asymmetric Classiﬁcation Decision
One possible outcome of the second stage is that only one ﬁrm i classiﬁes
risks while the other j does not. Then ﬁrm i can distinguish customers with
zero expected loss from those with expected cost c. This gives ﬁrm i the
opportunity to set two diﬀerent premiums, one for each risk class. The other
ﬁrm j cannot distinguish risk classes and it can only set a uniform premium
for all applicants. The only information available to ﬁrm j when making an
oﬀer to an arbitrary applicant is that the expected cost will be the average
loss (1 − a)c.
In contrast to the symmetric case, no pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium
exists. A mixed-strategy equilibrium, however, does exist. The solution will
be in line with the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) although the
settings diﬀer widely. This equilibrium will allow to compute the payoﬀs
which are relevant for the decision in the second stage.
In the ﬁrst step, I will show that no equilibrium exists where both ﬁrms
play a pure strategy. Then I will give some properties and conditions for a
mixed strategy and, ﬁnally, compute it.
Non-existence of Pure-strategy Equilibrium
Assume that ﬁrm 1 applies a costly risk classiﬁcation scheme. Consequently,
ﬁrm 1 can assign an applicant to the high-risk class with expected loss c or
to the low-risk class with zero expected loss. Firm 2 does not classify the
applicants and it can only oﬀer a uniform premium. Let p0 and pc denote the
premiums oﬀered by ﬁrm 1 for the good and for the bad risks respectively
and let p2 denote the premium oﬀered by ﬁrm 2. The low-risk class faces
a pair of premiums (p0,p2) and the high-risk class faces a pair of premiums
(pc,p2). Each customer always purchases from the ﬁrm oﬀering the lower
premium. If one risk class faces two identical premiums, I assume that each
ﬁrm serves half of the customers of that risk class. It may happen that the
two risk classes are served by diﬀerent ﬁrms or that one ﬁrm serves both risk
classes.
In an equilibrium, ﬁrm 2 will never set a premium p2 as a pure strategy.
9It is obvious that it will never set a premium p2 < (1−a)c as a pure strategy.
Serving the entire market would result in losses. The only possibility for such
a strategy to be proﬁtable is that ﬁrm 1 undercuts in the high risk class. This
situation will not be realized because it would imply losses to ﬁrm 1 for sure.
There is no chance for ﬁrm 2 to make positive expected proﬁt from setting a
premium p2 < (1 − a)c.
A premium in the interval [(1−a)c;c] cannot be an equilibrium strategy
either. If ﬁrm 1 anticipates this premium p2, it will oﬀer p0 = p2 − ε to
slightly undercut p2 and will proﬁtably serve the good risks only. The bad
risks with expected cost c would remain with ﬁrm 2 and the latter would
serve them with p2 = (1 − a)c < c and incur losses. p2 = (1 − a)c cannot be
the solution to a pure strategy equilibrium because of cream skimming by
ﬁrm 1. Whichever premium ﬁrm 2 may set in the interval [(1−a)c;c], it can
proﬁtably be undercut by ﬁrm 1 on the market for good risks. When ﬁrm 1
attracts the good risks the bad risks remain with ﬁrm 2 which incurs losses.
If ﬁrm 2 sets p2 = c it cannot incur losses whatever the reaction of ﬁrm
1 is. Even serving the bad risks only yields a nonnegative proﬁt. The best
response of ﬁrm 1 would be a pair of premiums (p0,pc) with p0 = p2−ε = c−ε
and pc ≥ p2 = c. This pair of premiums maximizes proﬁt from the good risks.
As the bad risks are served with a fair premium, ﬁrm 1 cannot proﬁtably
attract them. It can only set a premium at or above c. For these premiums
of ﬁrm 1 to be a Nash equilibrium p2 must be the best-response to (p0,pc).
Obviously, it is not because ﬁrm 2 would prefer to set a uniform premium
p2 > (1−a)c which undercuts p0 = c−ε and serves both risk classes. Hence,
a premium p2 = c cannot be an equilibrium either. Furthermore, a premium
p2 > c cannot be optimal for ﬁrm 2 because it could be proﬁtably undercut
by ﬁrm 1. Firms have an incentive to undercut each other as long as p2 and
pc exceed c.
This has shown that no premium p2 exists which can be a pure-strategy
of ﬁrm 2. Conversely, I will argue that there is no pair of premiums (p0,pc)
which can be played as pure strategy in a Nash equilibrium.
Firm 1 will never set a premium pc < c. If such a premium sells, it would
make losses from the bad risks and raising pc would increase expected proﬁt.
The low-risk premium p0 may be set above or below (1−a)c. In the ﬁrst case
it can be undercut proﬁtably by ﬁrm 2 with a pure strategy p2 = p0 − ε. In
the second case, ﬁrm 2 would never sell to good risks and sets p2 ≥ c. Then
p0 would not be a best-response to p2.
10Mixed-strategy Equilibrium
As a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist, a Nash equilibrium can still
exist in mixed strategies. I will start by presenting the minimum proﬁt
condition for ﬁrm 1 which allows to generate restrictions for the support of
a mixed strategy. Then I will compute an equilibrium and derive the payoﬀs
to both ﬁrms.
As argued above, ﬁrm 2 will never set prices below (1 − a)c to prevent
sure losses. If ﬁrm 1 anticipates this, setting a premium p0 = (1 − a)c − ε
guarantees a proﬁt ap0 = a(1 − a)c. So, whatever strategy is played in
equilibrium, it must generate at least this proﬁt because ﬁrm 1 could always
recur on the strategy p0 = (1 − a)c
Assume that the Nash-equilibrium is characterized by two distribution
functions Fi(·), i = 1,2 and that the support of the corresponding density
functions is the interval [(1 − a)c;c]. Once the equilibrium strategies are
computed, I will argue that no ﬁrm i has an incentive to deviate from Fi(·).
Firm 1 can obtain a minimum proﬁt from playing the pure strategy
p0 = (1−a)c which will never be undercut. Any mixed-strategy must promise
equal or higher expected proﬁt than a(a − 1)c. A price p0
0 < (1 − a)c would
result in a lower proﬁt than a(1−a)c and this is not compatible with the mini-
mum proﬁt condition. Similarly, no price p0
0 > c is possible if ﬁrm 2’s support
is contained in the interval [(1 − a)c;c] and p0
0 would sell with probability
zero. This would contradict the minimum proﬁt condition too. Imagine that
the mixed-strategy played by ﬁrm 2 is deﬁned by the distribution function
F2(p0) which denotes the probability that p2 is smaller or equal to p0 and
pc = c. Then ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt is Eπ1 = ap0[1−F2(p0)]. The ﬁrst order
condition is a[1 − F2(p0) − F 0
2(p0)p0] = 0 and the solution to this diﬀerential
equation is F2(p0) = 1−
C2
p0 where C2 is an arbitrary constant. From the min-
imum proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 follows that Eπ1 = ap1[1 − F2(p0)] = aC2 ≥ a(1 − a)c.
From p2 ∈ [(1 − a)c;c] follows that p0 ≥ (1 − a)c because ﬁrm 1 will not set
premiums below (1 − a)c as noted above. As F2(p0) = 1 −
C2
p0 must be zero
for p0 = (1−a)c this determines C2 = (1−a)c and the value of the game for
ﬁrm 1 is
Eπ1 = a(1 − a)c. (4)
At the highest price possible c, the upper bound of the support, F2(x) = 1
11must hold. The distribution function indicates that F2(c) = 1 −
(1−a)c
c =
a < 1. Note that the distribution function of ﬁrm 2 is not atomless. The
indiﬀerence condition for ﬁrm 1 allows that Pr(p2 = c) = 1 − F2(c) = 1 − a.
If the support of ﬁrm 1 is an open interval (x1;c) the upper bound c is never
played with a positive probability and a price p1 approaching c arbitrarily
close from below undercuts p2 with the probability 1 − a and the expected





0 for x ≤ (1 − a)c
1 −
(1−a)c
x for (1 − a) < x < c
1 for c ≤ x.
(5)
Now, ﬁrm 1 can arrange the probability mass of its own density function
so as to make ﬁrm 2 indiﬀerent between all prices p2 ∈ [(1 − a)c;c].
Firm 2 has to consider two aspects when setting its premium, given the
mixed strategy F1(x) from ﬁrm 1. First, it knows that it makes losses from the
bad risks (p2−c)(1−a) when p2 < c. Secondly, a premium p2 = (1−a)c would
earn revenue equal to the losses from the bad risks which have to be covered.
Raising the premium would raise the revenue but, given F1(x), the probability
of earning any revenue from the good risks decreases. From the indiﬀerence
condition, proﬁt has to be constant for all prices in the support. Hence, the
revenue from the good risks has to be weighted with the probability which
makes the expected revenue equal to (p2−c)(1−a), the loss from serving the
bad risks. Aggregating the probabilities for all p2 ∈ [(1 − a)c;c] yields the
distribution function F1(x) which actually makes ﬁrm 2 indiﬀerent between
all possible prices p2. Since p2 = c is contained in the support for ﬁrm 2 and
the proﬁt when setting this price is zero, expected proﬁt must be zero for all
other prices p2 ∈ [(1 − a)c;c] which are played with positive probability too.
Expected proﬁt for ﬁrm 2 is Eπ2(p2) = ap2[1 − F1(p2)] + (1 − a)(p2 − c).
The ﬁrst term is the expected proﬁt from the good risks and the second is the
loss from serving the bad risks with premium p2. The ﬁrst order condition




C1 must be determined as to allow zero proﬁt to ﬁrm 2. Eπ2 = ap2[1 − 1
a +
C1
p2 ]+(1−a)(p2−c) = 0 holds for C1 =
(1−a)c
a . For F1(x) to be a distribution
function it has to adopt the value one at the upper bound x1 of the support
and the value zero at the lower bound x1. Setting F1(x1) = 0 and F1(x1) = 1
yields x1 = (1 − a)c and x1 = c which is in line with the relevant interval.










x for (1 − a)c < x < c
1 for c ≤ x
and
Pr(pc = c) = 1. (6)
Unlike F2(x) this distribution is atomless. For every price p2 in the sup-
port of ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2 makes zero expected proﬁt. As I noted above, F2(·)
has an atom at Pr(p2 = c) = 1 − a. This means that there is a probability
of ﬁrm 2 setting a price which has zero probability of earning revenue form
the good risks. The price c is the only one which generates no loss from the
bad risks which has to be covered from the low-risk class. Expected proﬁt
for ﬁrm 2 is zero for all p2 ∈ [(1 − a)c,c].
In contrast to the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
this equilibrium always exists when bad risks are few. Firm 2 plays p2 = c
with probability 1 − a. This means that ﬁrm 1 could earn positive expected
proﬁt (1 − a)ac
2 from playing p0 = c with probability one, given the strategy
F2(·) of ﬁrm 2. The expected proﬁt is the proﬁt from the good risks which
is shared equally between both ﬁrms weighted with the probability that ﬁrm
2 plays p2 = c. It is easy to verify that ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to give
probability weight to p1 = c because the expected proﬁt from this strategy
is (1 − a)ac
2 which is always smaller than the expected proﬁt a(1 − a)c from
playing F1(·).
2.3 Classiﬁcation Decision
When taking the decision in the second stage whether to apply a costly
risk classiﬁcation scheme or not, the ﬁrms need the information about the
payoﬀs of the third stage. The payoﬀs from the price competition have been
derived in the previous subsections. The basic outcome is that an insurance
company proﬁts only from being the sole classifying ﬁrm. In addition to
the net proﬁt from selling insurance coverage the ﬁrms have to consider the
classiﬁcation costs. When taking the classiﬁcation decision, the ﬁrms know
only their own cost Ki but not the exact cost of their opponent. The only
information available is that the competitor’s cost is a random draw from a
uniform distribution on the interval [T −;T +].
13As the ﬁrm i can only rely on beliefs about its opponent’s type K0
j ∈
[T −;T +] the solution of the game is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This
implies that ﬁrm i has to specify its strategy for each type Ki he could be
assigned to. Although nature has drawn a particular type Ki and revealed
it to player i, it is necessary for player i to consider his strategy for all other
types K0
i 6= Ki, K0
i ∈ [T −;T +], because what j will do depends on j’s beliefs
about the type of i and each of i’s types’ strategies. Table 1 shows the
expected proﬁts for the ﬁrms when nature has privately revealed the type Ki
to the ﬁrm i which has chosen one strategy from {RC;U} where RC and U
is the ﬁrm’s decision for and against risk classiﬁcation respectively.
(Firm 1, Firm 2) RC U
RC −K1,−K2 a(1 − a)c − K1,0
U 0,a(1 − a)c − K2 0,0
Table 1: Payoﬀs from the Pricing Stage
Firm i will develop a classifying scheme if it is costless. It will still do so if
classiﬁcation cost does not exceed an upper bound, say ti ∈ [T −;T +]. Then
ﬁrm i’s strategy is RC for Ki ≤ ti and U for Ki > ti. This holds for ﬁrm
j too. Firm i can compute expected proﬁts from each strategy from the set
{RC,U}. Playing RC yields −KiPr{Kj ≤ tj}+(π−Ki)Pr{Kj > tj} where
π = a(1 − a)c. Playing U yields zero expected proﬁt. Let ∆T = T + − T −,
then Pr{Kj ≤ tj} = F(tj) =
tj−T−
∆T is the probability that a randomly drawn
Kj is smaller than or equal to tj. So ﬁrm 1 plays RC if
−Ki
tj − T −
∆T
+ (π − Ki)

1 −




















(8) and (9) simultaneously yield
ti = tj = π




T + − T − + π
. (10)
14It is easy to verify that T − < ti < T +. The second inequality is π
∆T+πT + <
T + and it is always fulﬁlled for π > 0. The ﬁrst transforms to T −∆T < πT +−
πT − = π∆T or T − < π. For the reasonable assumption that classiﬁcation
cost will never exceed net expected proﬁt (before classifying cost) T + < π
the last inequality becomes T − < T + < π which is always true.
These computations state that there exist critical values ti for the classi-
fying costs for i = 1,2. Then the ﬁrms play pure strategies in the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium as follows: When ﬁrms realize that they can develop a clas-
sifying scheme at costs which do not exceed that limit they will do so and
apply the scheme. If the development costs are higher they will refrain from
classiﬁcation activities.
In the ﬁrst stage, nature assigns a type Ki to each ﬁrm. Any ﬁrm will
only engage in classiﬁcation activities if it expects nonnegative proﬁt. A ﬁrm
Ki > ti will not classify and has zero expected proﬁt. Ki ≤ ti is the more
interesting case. Combining the left side of (7) with (10) yields the expected





Inserting Ki ≤ ti in (11) shows that ﬁrm i makes zero expected proﬁt when
Ki = ti. Then ti−Ki is the expected proﬁt for ﬁrm i at the beginning of the
second stage.
As the ﬁrms can decide to classify risks after they have knowledge about
the cost Ki and the expected proﬁt, they will only choose RC if this promises
nonnegative proﬁt. For Ki < ti the expected proﬁt in strictly positive and
over all, before the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrms have a positive expected proﬁt too.
The ex ante expected proﬁt EΠi is ti −Ki weighted with the probability for



























2 > 0. (12)
152.4 Discussion
It is a technical issue that expected proﬁt in this Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is positive. The probability for a ﬁrm to play the strategies RC and U
are determined by the mutual beliefs about the competitor’s cost. These
are the commonly known distribution functions. If a ﬁrm has development
costs equal to the critical value Ki = ti, this ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between both
strategies. The expected payoﬀ from playing RC is equal to Ki = ti. If
Ki < ti, ﬁrm j does not alter its strategy because no information is revealed
to j. Firm i still obtains the expected proﬁt from playing RC. The diﬀerence
ti − Ki is then the positive expected proﬁt for ﬁrm i when it can play the
strategy RC at low cost.
If table 1 were the payoﬀ matrix of a static game with complete informa-
tion, the outcome would be a mixed-strategy equilibrium and the expected
proﬁt would be zero. In the present setting, the probabilities are determined
by the cost parameter Ki and these vary as the cost level changes. Firms
proﬁt from their cost being unknown to their competitors. There is no in-
centive to disclose this information.
The classiﬁcation decision is a pure strategy for both ﬁrms. A ﬁrm which
develops a classiﬁcation scheme is ex ante not certain about the cost and
the probability of achievement but once the scheme is set up the uncertainty
about Ki vanishes. The present game is equivalent to the ’Battle of the
Sexes’. In this class of games, ﬁrms would deliberately unveil their strategy
if they could do so in a credible way. This incentive is compatible with the
observation of the actual insurance market immediately after deregulation.
Firms started their classiﬁcation program as soon as they were allowed to do.
Actually, screening applicants according to many criteria can be observed by
competitors and this is a credible commitment. The payoﬀ matrix implies
that a ﬁrm has an advantage if it manages to commit to RC before its
competitor chooses a strategy. This allows to interpret the development cost
as a ﬁrm’s estimation of the time it will take to set up a classiﬁcation scheme
or as an estimation of the eﬀectiveness of a newly elaborated scheme.
Welfare Implications
Welfare considerations can focus on two aspects in this setting. First, the only
resources which are forgone are the classiﬁcation costs. As the ﬁrms’ expected
proﬁt is positive, on average, these costs are borne by the consumers. The ex
16ante distribution of the classiﬁcation costs determine the overall classiﬁcation
costs in the insurance industry. Firms classify iﬀ Ki ≤ ti = π















∆T+πT +2 − T −2
∆T
. (13)
Only in the situation where one ﬁrm classiﬁes, the good risks pay pre-
miums which exceed their expected loss. In this situation, the ﬁrms earn
premium income which cover the classiﬁcation costs. The probability of this
situation is 1/2 when ti = (T + + T −)/2 is in the middle of the interval
[T −;T +]. Then each ﬁrm classiﬁes with probability 1/2. The probability of
an asymmetric classiﬁcation decision is lower when ti shifts oﬀ the middle of
the interval.8
Expanding the last term of (13) yields
 
π
∆T+πT + − T − 
π
∆T+πT + + T −
T + − T − . (14)
Similarly to a Laﬀer-curve, the eﬀect of an increase in individual classiﬁcation
costs on EK is ambiguous. Imagine that the increase is done by a shift of the
limits of the interval [T −;T +] by the same amount. If ti is closer to T + the
probability of exactly one classifying ﬁrm decreases. This probability eﬀect
outweighs the cost raise. Being on the good (left) side of the Laﬀer curve,
an increase of classiﬁcation costs raises overall costs in the market. Then the
model suggests cost reduction as a policy implication.
As T − approaches T + the uncertainty about the competitor’s cost van-
ishes and from (14) follows limT−→T+ = 2T +. These are the total classiﬁca-
tion costs. As expected proﬁt is zero in the mixed-strategy equilibrium in
the game with complete information, the costs are still fully borne by the
consumers.
When the ﬁrms make identical classiﬁcation decision, I predict Bertrand
competition. Classiﬁcation costs are borne by the ﬁrms, if they occur. Typ-
ically, R&D costs are sunk. Setting up a classiﬁcation system can be con-
sidered as sunk costs but classifying still generates variable costs when ap-
plicants ﬁle in detailed questionnaires which have to be analyzed. I have
presented a Bayesian game where ﬁrms can infer their competitor’s type
8argmaxq[q(1 − q)] = 1/2.
17from its behavior. The present model ends after payoﬀs are realized. Actu-
ally, contracts can be renewed after expiration. This allows for adjustments
of the classiﬁcation system and the premiums which will prevent permanent
losses.
The second welfare aspect considers the provision of consumers with in-
surance coverage. Like in Rothschild and Stiglitz, good risks suﬀer a negative
externality from the presence of bad risks when the applicants cannot credi-
bly reveal their risk class. Their model predicts that good risks are deprived
from full insurance and, although the customers are oﬀered a fair premium,
a welfare loss from underinsurance occurs. In the present model the good
risks always pay a higher premium than their expected cost if one or both
ﬁrms are not fully informed about the applicants’ risk type because they re-
frain from classifying. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz, the ﬁrms oﬀer
exclusively full insurance policies. This is adequate for mandatory insurance
coverage with standard policy conditions like automobile liability insurance.
The expenditure for insurance is small relative to the purchase of an
automobile. However, some consumers will renounce to operate a car if the
total expenditure become too high. Introducing elastic demand would imply
that provision is no more eﬃcient when prices exceed marginal cost because
some customers refrain from purchasing.
If, like in the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, the low-risk customers were
free to choose the level of coverage after the ﬁrms have set prices above
the fair premium, they would purchase less than full coverage. This is a
loss of rent for the low-risk customers. On the other hand, the high-risk
customers will not obtain overinsurance because an insurance company does
not compensate for more than the actual loss. Only when zero or (accidently)
both ﬁrms incur the classiﬁcation costs, there is no loss of consumer rent.
Policy Implications
In the context of insurance regulation, the model allows for some implications
for insurance regulation policy. As noted in section 2.1, under the German
insurance regulation before 1994, ﬁrm behavior was highly coordinated by the
regulatory agency. The extent of risk classiﬁcation and premium calculation
were under the agency control. All ﬁrms applied the same classiﬁcation
scheme and had to keep the price setting conditions which mainly consisted of
a minimum premium level. In consequence, ﬁrm behavior was symmetric and
18proﬁt abundant. In the payoﬀ matrix the payoﬀs from symmetric behavior
turn to be the Nash equilibria and in contrast to the competitive market
there is no lack of coordination and no mixed strategy equilibrium. It is the
regulatory agency which prescribes the same intensity of risk classiﬁcation
to all ﬁrms and, thus, the same strategy.
In the present model, there are two sources of welfare losses, classiﬁcation
costs and the diﬀerence between marginal cost and prices. Both can be
reduced by insurance regulation policy. I have argued that total classiﬁcation
cost can be lowered by decreasing them on the ﬁrm level when they are low or
increasing them when they are high. The welfare loss from prices exceeding
marginal cost can only be reduced by reducing this markup. The model
suggests to improve the knowledge of the whole insurance industry about
risk classes. The direct eﬀect would be to save on resources on classiﬁcation
activities. Additionally, a drastic reduction of classiﬁcation cost on the ﬁrm
level is desirable to ensure that the level of classiﬁcation cost is on the good
side of the Laﬀer-curve. The ﬁrst-best situation is attained when both ﬁrms
assign each applicant to a particular risk class. Then, Bertrand competition
eliminates proﬁt margins and welfare losses from limited provision. The
information necessary to establish a uniform risk classiﬁcation system is the
same for all ﬁrms. It is suﬃcient to collect them only once in the industry.
Either the ﬁrms may be allowed to cooperate or the regulatory agency shall
provide the information. Considering the literature on R&D cooperation,
this is a common policy implication.
The Insurance Block Exemption Regulation9 is limited to a ten-year pe-
riod and allows the insurance industry to run common statistics. In general,
horizontal agreements by ﬁrms are prohibited by Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty. The regulation in force includes a limited number of characteris-
tics in the exemption which may be collected jointly. When interpreting
the strategies RC as applying more risk classifying criteria than in strategy
U, then the model suggests to extend the number of characteristics to in-
clude in the common statistics. Unfortunately, the draft for the succeeding
Commission Regulation adopts the previous as it stands.
Of course some restrictions to the implications of the present model exist.
I neglect the classical problems of insurance markets like adverse selection
and moral hazard. I assume that every applicant can be clearly assigned
to one risk class and that the mode of risk classiﬁcation does not aﬀect the
9Commission Regulation (EEC) 3932/92 of 21 December 1992 OJ L397/7.
19behavior of applicants for insurance coverage. May be an applicant buys
a 4-door car instead of 2-door car to pay less insurance premium although
this does not alter his driving habits. Such problems arise when risk classes
become highly subdivided.
3 Conclusion
One consequence of the deregulation of the German insurance market is the
extensive application of risk classiﬁcation schemes by insurance companies.
This paper has shown that the observed heterogeneous behavior of similar
ﬁrms on a homogeneous goods market is compatible with the assumption of
rational behavior. Thereby, it is in line with the well-established ﬁndings of
Rothschild and Stiglitz, that bad risks exert a negative externality on the
good risks due to asymmetric information about risk types. This gives scope
to further welfare improvements. Improving the eﬀectiveness of classiﬁcation
schemes may raise the allocative eﬃciency of insurance pricing by improving
and assimilating the insurers’ information on risk classes. Then competition
tends to be of Bertrand type.
After deregulation, no regulative agency monitors minimum proﬁt levels.
The insurance companies earn zero expected proﬁt when ﬁrms have average
classiﬁcation costs and introducing common statistics for all ﬁrms on risk
classes does not alter the proﬁt level. So, the Insurance Block Exemption
Regulation gives rise to welfare enhancement. Upon renewal of the block
exemption it would be desirable to extend the number of characteristics which
may be collected jointly.
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